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Every few years, a new round of malpractice insurance premium increases
occurs, and there are renewed pressures on public officials to "do something
about the malpractice insurance problem." Although there is no consensus
about the causes of the problem, views about the causes are strongly held.
The views often depend on where the observer stands, and there is a
regrettable tendency to identify a single culprit-"greedy lawyers" paid on a
contingent fee, "careless doctors," "litigious patients," or "greedy insurers."
Unfortunately, little is really known about the causes of the malpractice
insurance crises and about the efficacy of alternative policy options. In part,
lack of knowledge is the result of inadequate data-but there are also few
serious theoretical studies on malpractice issues.
Research by Patricia Danzon, sometimes with coauthors, is an exception to
this generalization about lack of useful studies. Her theoretical, empirical,
and policy analysis in the malpractice area is imaginative and careful, making
good use of best-practice economic techniques. Much of her work has been
technical and is inaccessible to many noneconomists. Although Danzon's
most recent book does not break much new ground, it is a welcome summary
of much of her past research on malpractice, written and organized in a form
that will be accessible to readers outside her field.
Danzon's theoretical analysis, both positive and normative, is based on the
economist's neoclassical model. Each party in the transaction maximizes his
or her well-being subject to constraints. Information is often difficult for
patients to obtain. Because of asymmetric information, the doctor may be
well positioned to take advantage of the patient; making the doctor liable for
compensation in cases of injury due to negligence is one mechanism, albeit an
imperfect one, for protecting the patient against abuse.
It is also possible for doctors to be too cautious, that is, to provide too
much preventive care. The same neoclassical paradigm states that an efficient
outcome is one that results in the sum of four types of costs being
minimized-insured losses, uninsured losses, prevention cost, and overhead
(cost of litigation, insurance overhead). Thus, a dollar of prevention is only
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worthwhile if it results in a dollar of saving in the other three types of cost.
Using rather straightforward economic concepts, Danzon shows that, on
theoretical grounds, it is not possible to say that too much is now spent on
preventive care ("defensive medicine").
Nor, based on analysis with a neoclassical model, can it be said with
certainty that compensating a plaintiff lawyer on a contingent fee basis will
lead to more suits. Danzon argues that the number of suits filed is likely to be
higher under contingent fee compensation, not so much because contingent
fee compensation stimulates excessive cases, but rather because risk-averse
plaintiffs are more likely to sue when they do not have to pay attorneys an
hourly wage. Another useful application of the neoclassical model is
Danzon's analysis (from an earlier article with Lillard') of the decision to
settle malpractice suits out of court. Predictions from the model are largely
supported by the empirical evidence presented in Danzon's book.
The book's empirical research ranges from simple presentation of facts to
formal statistical analysis using regression techniques. Several facts stand out
and are not generally known or discussed in policy debates on malpractice.
For example, the vast majority of injuries arising out of apparently negligent
care do not result in a suit. This means there are plenty of potential cases to
draw from when the public's propensity to sue increases or the legal climate
becomes more favorable to plaintiffs. These data run counter to the view that
the number of suits exceeds the number of injuries due to negligence.
Another widespread perception is that court awards are (almost) random.
Danzon's data show relationships between severity of injury and size of award.
Plaintiffs have a higher probability of winning in cases of obvious physician
error. Hourly earnings of defense attorneys, who are paid by the hour, and of
their counterparts, who work for plaintiffs and are paid on a contingent fee
basis, are similar.
Regression analysis allows Danzon to investigate the effect of policy and
nonpolicy factors on frequency of suits and size of awards. Although this
work is competently performed, it yields few unambiguous findings. The
number of physicians per capita in a state, included as a measure of exposure
to iatrogenic injury, is a statistically significant determinant of claims
frequency. Another comparatively good predictor of frequency is the percent
of population living in urban areas. Danzon (like this reader) is not sure
precisely which causal factors are represented by the urban variable. Most
variables in her regressions do not have significant effects on claims frequency
or severity (dollar amount) per claim.
Policymakers are particularly interested in the effectiveness of alternative
policy options in controlling growth in claims and in awards. Unfortunately,
the right empirical analysis is difficult to perform. Pertinent data are typically
only available for a span of a few years, thus at best allowing an assessment of
1. Danzon & Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J.
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short-run effects of policy changes. It is difficult to obtain precise information
on policy changes that have been implemented. For instance, while
information on states that place a dollar limit on awards is readily available, it
is much more difficult to obtain data on the dollar values of these limits. If a
study merely focused on limits, it would presumably not be difficult to find the
information at the necessary level of detail. There are many policy options,
however, and rather subtle dimensions of policy changes are difficult to
quantify. Danzon measures policy variables in terms of the months the policy
change was in effect during the observational period. This is at best a crude
measure of "quantity." Many policy changes are interrelated, making it
difficult to isolate the effects of individual changes. Also, the policy changes
themselves are not exogenous, but rather reflect the experiences of individual
states with malpractice insurance cost and availability. (Some analysis by
Danzon of determinants of policy changes is a first step in examining the
endogeneity of such changes.) Her regression results imply that post-1975
tort reforms had a stronger effect in 1976 than subsequently-an implausible
finding.
Danzon finds that states (1) enacting a limit on awards experienced a
nineteen percent average reduction in award size two years after
implementation of the limit; (2) mandating offset of compensation from
collateral sources had fifty percent lower awards within two years, but laws
admitting evidence of collateral compensation without mandating an offset
had no discernable effect; and (3) eliminating ad damnum reduced total claim
cost (but had no effect on the individual components of total claim cost,
frequency of claims, and payment per claim). Attorney fee limits, statute of
limitations changes, pretrial screening, and restrictions on the use of res ipsa
loquitur had little or no effect.
More useful on balance than the regression analysis is Danzon's analysis of
specific institutional arrangements. What, for example, are effects of
changing from an occurrence to a claims-made policy? More generally, why
does malpractice insurance fail to meet any of the ideal conditions of an
insurable risk, and how does this relate to insurers' seemingly erratic and
irrational behavior in malpractice insurance premium pricing? What would
be the effects of changing from the present system to private contracting or
no-fault?
The author does not present a blueprint for change, but she does offer
some specific suggestions. For instance, Danzon favors instituting scheduled
benefits for pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss to replace the current system
which bases compensation on the individual case and is open-ended with
respect to award size. Long statutes of limitations are designed to protect
victims of latent injuries, but they create nondiversifiable risk for insurers that
issue occurrence policies in a volatile legal climate. Compensation for riskbearing must in turn be reflected in premiums. Danzon favors reducing the
statute of limitations with reliance on private first-party insurance (health
insurance) and public programs to compensate persons for whom the injury
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becomes evident after the limit. Latent injuries, with the exception of birth
defects, appear to be rare.
This book covers a lot of territory on a subject that is not understood very
well. It is "must reading" for researchers, policymakers, lawyers, and
physicians working in the malpractice area.

